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RACE OR PARTY?:
HOW COURTS SHOULD THINK ABOUT
REPUBLICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE IT HARDER
TO VOTE IN NORTH CAROLINA AND ELSEWHERE
Richard L. Hasen∗
INTRODUCTION
I begin with a story which may sound familiar. Following election reforms in North Carolina, African American voter turnout surges, setting
records. The North Carolina legislature then changes hands, and the new
party in power, which has few, if any, African American supporters, passes
new voting restrictions that make it very difficult for African Americans
to vote. Turnout plummets in the state, cratering among African American
voters.
The story is true. The year was not 2008 — when African American
voters helped North Carolina’s electoral votes go to Democrat Barack
Obama before a new Republican legislature (in 2013) passed a tough set
of voting rules — but 1900, and the party doing the disenfranchising was
not the Republican Party but the Democratic Party. Professor J. Morgan
Kousser in his path-breaking 1974 book, The Shaping of Southern Politics,
tells the compelling story of African American disenfranchisement at the
beginning of the last century.1
North Carolina had “perhaps the most democratic”2 political system in
the late–nineteenth century South, with very high turnout among adult
males, with black men voting in large numbers, and without the extensive
ballot-box stuffing and election fraud that had been occurring in most
other Southern states. Back then, of course, African American voters supported the Republican Party, the party of Lincoln. Republicans had strong
black support in the state, but their white support was largely limited to
hill and mountain areas, as racist white voters in much of the state would
not vote for a party supported by blacks. Populists put up their own candidates and gained some support. Republicans and Populists put up a
joint, or fused, set of candidates by the mid-1890s, and they captured the
North Carolina legislature from Democrats in 1894.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Guy
Charles, Morgan Kousser, and Rick Pildes for useful comments and suggestions. This Essay is based
upon the 2013 American Public Values Lecture the author delivered in October 2013 at North Carolina
State University.
1 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 182–95 (1974).
2 Id. at 183.
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Then, as now, North Carolina was a closely divided partisan state, and
state laws changed as the parties changed power. Along with adopting a
more progressive legislative agenda, the fused Republican-Populists passed
major election reforms, reversing earlier Democratic laws that suppressed
African American turnout. Kousser says that North Carolina had “probably the fairest and most democratic election law in the post-Reconstruction
South.”3 The new laws required appointment of neutral election judges,
smaller precincts, limitations on registrars’ ability to disqualify voters,
tougher standards to challenge voters, and colored ballots with symbols to
help illiterate voters cast effective ballots.
The reforms worked: turnout hit a whopping 85.4% of eligible voters
in 1896, black turnout was the highest in any southern election since 1876,
Republicans got their first North Carolina governor since Reconstruction,
and the fused Republican-Populist parties increased their majorities. African American George H. White was elected to Congress from North Carolina. But Congressman White would be the last African American member of Congress from the South until 1972 and the last from North
Carolina until 1992 (with the election of Mel Watt and Eva Clayton).4
There was a backlash against African American success. Democrats
resorted to violence and fraud in 1898, and the Republican-Populist coalition became strained, including in disputes over racial policies. Democrats
took over the state legislature, and their first order of business was to reverse the election reforms in order to ease the passage of a state constitutional amendment to disenfranchise African American voters. The Raleigh
News and Observer editorialized in favor of reversing the election reforms,
stating that the legislature should “make it impossible for any element of
white voters to appeal to the Negro voters upon any public question.”5
The purpose of the reforms was to disenfranchise blacks and lower-class
whites. Democrats’ new election law changed Election Day from November to August. It required all voters to register anew and gave registrars
discretion to exclude voters. “Finally,” Kousser explains, “the law provided that any ballot placed in the wrong box — there were six — whether by
election officers or the voter himself, would be void.”6
With the new election law in place, the fight, which got ugly, turned to
the plebiscite over the disenfranchising state constitutional amendment.7
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3
4

Id. at 187.
See People Search, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/People/Search (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
5 KOUSSER, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 190 (quoting Editorial, About Submitting Questions to the People, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan 20, 1899, at 4) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
6 Id.
7 The amendment imposed a poll tax and literacy test, with a grandfather clause. For the text, see
8.7: The Suffrage Amendment, LEARN NC, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-newsouth/4365
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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Former Member of Congress Alfred Moore Waddell told a crowd the day
before the election: “You are Anglo-Saxons. You are armed and prepared,
and you will do your duty. . . . Go to the polls to-morrow, and if you find
the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if he refuses, kill
him.”8
Thanks to fraud, intimidation, violence, and racial animus, the amendment passed. Afterward, overall voter turnout in North Carolina plummeted and African American turnout dried up completely. Eventually, the
state Republican Party gave up on African Americans — now disenfranchised and unable to support the Party — seeing them as what Kousser
terms “a lost and damaging cause.”9
The fight in 1900 was about race — and it was about partisan politics.
You could not separate the two: racial politics affected the composition of
the political parties, and parties engaged in racial politics in part for partisan ends. The story Kousser tells is a story of race and party: the only
way to understand it fully is to see the complexity and interaction between
these forces.
Fast forward to 2013 and the new fight in North Carolina over House
Bill 589, which has gotten national attention. 10 The law was passed by a
new Republican legislature over staunch Democratic objections following
a Democratic presidential victory in 2008 and a closely contested 2012
presidential race. It includes a strict voter identification provision. The
law also cuts a week off early voting in the state (used by up to seventy
percent of African American voters in 2012) and bars local election boards
from keeping the polls open on the final Saturday before the election after
1:00 PM. It keeps the same number of hours on a fewer number of days.
It eliminates same-day voter registration. It opens up the precincts to
“challengers,” who can gum up the works at polling places and dissuade
voters from showing up in the first place. It bans paying voter registration–card circulators by the piece. It eliminates preregistration of sixteenand seventeen-year-olds in high schools. It provides that a voter who
votes in the wrong precinct (perhaps because of a poll worker’s error) will
have her whole ballot thrown out (earlier law had allowed such ballots to
count for those races in which the voter was eligible to vote).
Like the fights in 1900, today’s fight over North Carolina’s controversial new voting law is about race and party politics. In this way, it is noth–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

8 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW 110–11 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting The North Carolina Race Conflict, 60 THE OUTLOOK (New York, N.Y.) 707, 708 (1898))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9 KOUSSER, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 195.
10 For the text of the law, see H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2013/Bills/House/PDF/H589v8.pdf; see also Evan Perez, Justice
Department Sues North Carolina over Voting Law, CNN (Sept. 30, 2013, 6:01 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/us/north-carolina-voting-lawsuit.
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ing new. But thanks to how the U.S. Supreme Court has conceived of the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution and how Congress has defined racial politics in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,11 we may be forced to choose: race
or party?
The realignment of the parties in the South following the Civil Rights
movement of the 1960s has created a reality in which today most African
American voters are Democrats and most white conservative voters are
Republicans. That was not the case back in 1900 or before the Civil
Rights movement, when Southern Democrats were conservative and
Northern Democrats were more liberal. The Voting Rights Act, when
passed, was not seen as a law that helped the Democratic Party — quite
the opposite. But today, many Republicans view the Voting Rights Act as
a law that favors Democrats, especially with a Democratic and African
American President and Attorney General administering the law.
When party and race coincide, as they did in 1900 and they do today, it
is much harder to separate racial and partisan intent and effect. Today,
white voters in the South are overwhelmingly Republican and, in some of
the Southern states, are less likely to be willing to vote for a black candidate than are white voters in the rest of the country.12 The Democratic
Party supports a left-leaning platform that includes more social assistance
to the poor and higher taxes. Some Republicans view such plans as aiding
racial minorities.
Given the overlap of considerations of race and party, when a Republican legislature like North Carolina’s passes a law making it harder for
some voters to vote, is that a law about party politics or a law about race?
As I explain, if courts call this a law about party politics and view it
through the lens of partisan competition, then the law is more likely to
stand and the fight over it will be waged at the ballot box. If courts call
this a law about race and view it through the lens of the struggle over race
and voting rights, then the law is likely to fall and the fight will be settled
primarily in courts.
This contrast was on display in a brief that the State of Texas recently
filed in its fight with the U.S. Department of Justice over whether to put
Texas back under federal voting supervision. The Justice Department argues that proof of intentional racial discrimination in voting is found in
Texas’s recent redistricting plan, which disfavors minority voters and officeholders. Texas’s defense is that its law is about partisan politics, not
about race, and it is therefore acceptable:
DOJ’s accusations of racial discrimination are baseless. In 2011, both houses
of the Texas Legislature were controlled by large Republican majorities, and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11
12

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
See Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 208 (2013).
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their redistricting decisions were designed to increase the Republican Party’s
electoral prospects at the expense of the Democrats. It is perfectly constitutional for a Republican-controlled legislature to make partisan districting decisions, even if there are incidental effects on minority voters who support
Democratic candidates.13

Note that Texas’s defense is that it was deliberately passing its law “at
the expense of Democrats.” Leave aside for a moment the fact that discriminating on the basis of political party should serve as an indictment rather than a defense of Texas’s policy. Instead, note the bifurcation of race
and party. To Texas, there is just an “incidental” effect on minority voters. If Texas is right that party discrimination is a valid defense under the
law, but that racial discrimination violates the Voting Rights Act, then
courts need to make a distinction: race or party?
The race versus party bifurcation is unhelpful, and the solution to these
new battles over election rules — what I call “the Voting Wars” — is going to have to come from the federal courts. Courts should apply a more
rigorous standard to review arguably discriminatory voting laws. When a
legislature passes an election-administration law (outside of the redistricting context) discriminating against a party’s voters or otherwise burdening
voters, that fact should not be a defense. Instead, courts should read the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to require the legislature
to produce substantial evidence that it has a good reason for burdening
voters and that its means are closely connected to achieving those ends.
The achievement of partisan ends would not be considered a good reason
(as it appears to be in the redistricting context). This rule would both discourage party power grabs and protect voting rights of minority voters. In
short, it would inhibit discrimination on the basis of both race and party,
and protect all voters from unnecessary burdens on the right to vote.
I. NORTH CAROLINA AS PART OF THE VOTING WARS
It is easy to situate North Carolina’s law in the context of a national
battle we have witnessed since 2000 over the rules for running our elections. I have told the story many times before14 and will not dwell on it
here. The last decade has included great partisan battles over the rules for
running our elections. Voter identification laws, for example, have been
passed along partisan lines, with Republicans supporting them in the name
of fraud prevention and Democrats blasting them in the name of voter
suppression. There is virtually no impersonation fraud which a voter iden–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c) of the Voting
Rights Act at 19, Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Texas-reply-on-Sec.-3-of-VRA-8-513.pdf.
14 I tell it in most detail in RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (2012). On the extent and
veracity of claims of voter fraud and suppression, see chapters 2 and 3. Id. at 41–104.
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tification law would prevent, but it also appears that Democrats have exaggerated the extent to which these laws disenfranchise eligible voters who
want to vote.15
The latest wave of Republican-led laws, however, may be increasing
the burden on voters. While some of the early voter identification laws
were not that onerous, Texas’s and North Carolina’s laws appear to make
it more difficult to vote by accepting fewer forms of ID for voting and, in
Texas’s case, offering fewer (and more distant) locations at which a person
can obtain a “free” voter identification card. Other North Carolina changes, such as eliminating same-day voter registration and preventing the
counting of ballots cast in a wrong precinct, may have an even larger effect on voter registration and turnout than the identification laws.
Judged through a partisan lens then, North Carolina’s law is just the
latest Republican attempt to skew the electorate at least moderately to gain
electoral advantage.
II. NORTH CAROLINA AS PART OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE
I turn the lens from partisan politics to race and back to the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act first suspended and
then later banned literacy tests and other voting rules. The ban on tests,
combined with the presence of federal observers, mattered a great deal at
the beginning. Over time, the preclearance provision became the most
significant piece of the Act. Under this provision, a state or locality covered by section 5 had the burden to prove that any change in voting rules
that it proposed would not have the effect, and was not enacted with the
purpose, of making minority voters worse off.
The Voting Rights Act has been very successful. Although the percentage of objections was never high, because so many voting changes
were submitted (everything from a ten-year redistricting plan to moving a
polling place across the street) there were over 2000 objections between
1969 and 1989.16 Racial gaps in voter registration fell. The number of
minority officeholders grew, especially after Congress expanded the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to include a new section 2, which mandated the
creation of new majority-minority districts across the country. In the seven originally covered section 5 states, there were fewer than 100 black
elected officials in 1975. That number rose to 3265 in 1989. In six states
with especially large Hispanic concentrations, the number of Hispanic officeholders increased from 1280 to 3592 in 1990.17
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15
16

See id.
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 168–69 (5th ed. 2012).
17 Id. at 203.
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The greatest significance of the law in recent years has been to give
minority voters a bargaining chip — a chance to sit at the table and express concerns about proposed voting rules.18 The Justice Department has
brought in minority voters into investigations and into negotiations with
covered jurisdictions over proposed voting rules. Covered jurisdictions
changed their laws to ease the impact on minority voters.
A nice recent example of this comes from South Carolina, which
passed a voter identification law, one that was not quite as strict as Texas’s. South Carolina’s law allowed election officials to accommodate voters who had “reasonable impediment[s]” that prevented them from getting
the type of photo identification needed for voting.19 The Justice Department still objected, as did legal organizations representing minority voters.20 And because of section 5, South Carolina had the burden of showing that the voter identification requirement did not discriminate.21 As the
Justice Department’s case against South Carolina proceeded, the state watered down its law, making it easier for people without photo identification
to vote by expanding the “reasonable impediment” provision.22 The court
eventually approved South Carolina’s law for use in 2013, but only because section 5 spurred those changes. As Judge John Bates observed:
“Without the review process under the Voting Rights Act, South Carolina’s voter photo ID law certainly would have been more restrictive.”23
A different federal court blocked Texas’s new voter identification
law.24 Its reasoning was simple: voter identification laws disproportionately affect the poor in Texas, like those voters who would have to travel up
to 250 miles at their own expense to the county seat to get the so-called
“free” voter identification.25 African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately poor in Texas, and therefore Texas could not demonstrate under the section 5 standard that the law would not make minority voters
worse off.
Whatever impact these laws are going to have, their burdens are going
to fall hardest on the poor and the less educated. To the extent that the
vestiges of past discrimination mean that the poor will disproportionately
include minority voters, section 5 assured that at least in covered jurisdictions these new burdensome laws would not make minority voters worse
off. But the covered states objected. Texas in effect argued: “Why should
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 Richard L. Hasen, What’s Lost If the Voting Rights Act Falls?, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2013, 5:42 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/01/voting_rights_act_what_s_lost_i
f_the_supreme_court_kills_it.html.
19 See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012).
20 See id. at 38.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 35–36.
23 Id. at 53–54 (Bates, J., concurring).
24 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (mem.).
25 Id. at 139–40.
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we have to get federal approval before we implement a voter identification
law when a state like Indiana or Pennsylvania can implement a voter identification law without getting such permission?”
This past summer, the Supreme Court agreed. States and jurisdictions
that were covered under the section 5 preclearance rule were those with a
history of racial discrimination in voting, as measured by a formula based
in part on voter turnout statistics from 1964, 1968, or 1972. Section 5 was
supposed to be temporary, but Congress kept reauthorizing it without updating this coverage formula. The most recent update occurred in 2006,
when Congress renewed preclearance for another twenty-five years.26 In
2009, the Supreme Court issued an opinion warning that section 5 was in
danger of being struck down as an encroachment on states’ rights,27 but
Congress did nothing to update the coverage formula.28 Then in 2013, on
a 5-4 party line vote, the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder29 held
that the coverage formula’s use was unconstitutional, because it treat the
covered jurisdictions unfairly in violation of their rights to “equal sovereignty.”30 Although Congress might be able to pass a new coverage formula which would meet the Supreme Court’s test — I am doubtful about
that31 — there is no political will in Congress to do so.
The loss of section 5 and the passage of new restrictive voting laws by
states such as Texas and North Carolina in response has led the Justice
Department to challenge Texas’s and North Carolina’s rules, under provisions of the Voting Rights Act that were not challenged in Shelby County.32 Section 2 of the Act, which applies nationwide, allows minority voters to sue for denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of
race.33 The language of the section provides that one can prove denial or
abridgement by showing that the political processes leading to the nomination or election of officials in the state are not equally open to protected
minority members, in that minority voters have “less opportunity than oth-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26
27
28
29
30
31

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013).
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511–13 (2009).
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
133 S. Ct. 2612.
Id. at 2623; see also id. at 2623–24.
I explain the reasons in Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22
W M.
&
MARY
BILL
RTS.
J.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291612.
32 For documents related to Texas, see Litigation: United States v. Texas, ELECTION L. @
MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/USv.Texas.php (last updated Aug. 27, 2013,
11:08 AM). For documents related to North Carolina, see Litigation: United States v. North Carolina,
ELECTION
L.
@
MORITZ,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/UnitedStatesV.NorthCarolina.php (last updated Oct. 10,
2013, 8:52 AM).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006 & Supp. V. 2011).
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er members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.”34
Section 2 has been extremely successful in the redistricting context,
causing the creation of many majority-minority districts. But courts have
not read section 2 widely in the context of nonredistricting measures, such
as voter identification requirements or restrictions on early voting.35 Unlike section 5, the burden here is on the challengers, not on the state, to
disprove discriminatory effect. And unlike section 5, courts do not compare the old law to the new law; instead, courts compare the law in place
to the abstract principles of nondiscrimination contained in the language of
section 2.
Thus far, section 2 has not been a successful tool to challenge these
laws, and unless courts change course it likely will not work now. Concededly, there have been few section 2 cases considering application of the
provision to voter identification laws.36 However, if lower courts do
change course and start holding that section 2 covers things like voter
identification laws with a discriminatory effect, the Supreme Court could
hold that section 2 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it exceeds
congressional power and encroaches on states’ rights along the lines of the
reasoning in Shelby County.
The other provision that the Department of Justice is relying upon is
section 3 of the Voting Rights Act. This provision gives courts discretion
to impose preclearance on a state or locality that has recently been guilty
of intentional race discrimination in voting.37 It is discretionary; even if
the Justice Department could prove intention, a court need not impose preclearance and even if it does, it can limit preclearance to particular
changes or to a short period of time. The section 3 standard is tougher
than both the section 5 and section 2 standards. How will the Department
show that a state has discriminated on the basis of race, particularly when
the state defends and says: “We were acting in good faith in passing our
laws for good reasons, or at worst we were discriminating on the basis of
party, not race?”
That is Texas’s argument and could well be North Carolina’s, although
the latter is more likely to defend itself by claiming that its laws are necessary to prevent fraud or to promote efficiency. Texas may have a hard
time defending itself against charges of intentional racism, because just a
few years ago a federal court held that Texas did engage in intentional racial discrimination in its 2011 redistricting plan when, among other things,
it cut the “economic guts” out of Black Democratic legislators’ districts
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34
35

Id.
See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act,
57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 708–09 (2006).
36 Id. at 709.
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
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but not white Democratic legislators’ districts.38 We will see what kind of
evidence the Justice Department produces of intentional racial discrimination in North Carolina. It is also unclear if courts will infer discriminatory
intent based upon discriminatory effects.39 And once again, if any court
actually reimposes preclearance on Texas or North Carolina under section
3, the Supreme Court could reverse under Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle. Texas argues in its briefs that it is unconstitutional to
impose preclearance unless a state’s racist conduct is as bad as what existed in 1965, when Congress first passed the Voting Rights Act.40
III. RACE OR PARTY? YES
I turn now to address the race-or-party question head-on. Recall Texas’s defense to the attack on its redistricting plan: this is about party, rather
than race. But the lines between the two are inextricably intertwined.
To illustrate, consider another aspect of North Carolina history. In the
1990s, the state legislature was still controlled by Democrats, and redistricting was still subject to preclearance from the Justice Department.41
North Carolina had a long history of racial discrimination in its redistricting plans, and North Carolina knew it was going to have to do more to
foster minority representation to avoid Voting Rights Act liability.
The 1990s process of redistricting was brutal and political. Democrats
passed a congressional plan with just one majority-minority district, and
the Justice Department, then under the control of the first Bush Justice Department, demanded the creation of a second district to satisfy the requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Republicans thought
this requirement would work to their advantage, as the packing of AfricanAmerican voters into two districts would lead to more districts with a majority of Republican voters, helping give Republicans a majority in the
Congressional delegation.
Democrats, still controlling the redistricting process, nonetheless created two majority-minority districts of quite unusual shapes. One of these
districts ran 160 miles down I-85 from Durham to Charlotte. The Supreme
Court noted: “At one point the district remains contiguous only because it
intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over
them. One state legislator has remarked that ‘[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the dis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38 Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 160 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013)
(mem); see also id. at 160–61.
39 See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 16, at 179 (discussing the factors laid out in
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
40 Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c) of the Voting
Rights Act, supra note 13, at 2–3.
41 For the history of North Carolina’s 1990s redistricting, see generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER,
COLORBLIND INJUSTICE 243–76 (1999).
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trict.”42 The initial Republican objection to this plan was that it was an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Republican plaintiffs, led by controversial conservative political player Art Pope,43 claimed it is unconstitutional to draw district lines to hurt one political party.44
The courts, however, rejected a partisan gerrymandering claim. The
Supreme Court in the 1986 case Davis v. Bandemer45 had made it very
hard to bring claims based upon discrimination on the basis of party in redistricting, and more recently made bringing such claims even harder in
Vieth v. Jubelirer.46 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides no standard for separating unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders from permissible consideration of party, rendering all partisan gerrymandering claims losers.47
After the party-based claim challenging North Carolina’s redistricting
failed, opponents argued that the districting plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In the 1993 case of Shaw v. Reno,48 the Supreme Court agreed, holding that when voters are separated on the basis of
race into districts without adequate justification, this separation violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. This was not a claim
of vote dilution, but one based upon what Professor Richard Pildes has
called expressive harms49: the problem, the Court said, was the message
the district shapes sent to voters that race is all that matters in politics.50
Shaw was controversial, and the Supreme Court heard an unprecedented four challenges to North Carolina’s districts within the next decade.
The last challenge was the most interesting. In Easley v. Cromartie,51 the
Court held that the crazy-shaped district lines in the latest North Carolina
plan were not unconstitutional because they were designed to protect party,
not to divide on the basis of race.52
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Joan
Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43 On Pope, see generally Jane Mayer, State for Sale, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 90, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/10/111010fa_fact_mayer.
44 See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395, 397 (W.D.N.C.), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992) (mem).
45 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
46 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
47 See id. at 291 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
48 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
49 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 493
(1993).
50 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (noting that such a redistricting plan “reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group — regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live — think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls”).
51 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
52 Id. at 257.
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Easley is the origin of Texas’s argument that it should be able to pass
its tough redistricting law because the law was motivated by party rather
than race. Yet is hard to credit Texas’s explanation that the redistricting’s
effect on racial minorities is merely “incidental” if it targeted the Democratic Party. Consider the local Republican official in North Carolina who
recently told The Daily Show not only that if the state’s new voter identification law will hurt “a bunch of lazy blacks that wants the government to
give them everything — so be it,” but also that “the law is going to kick
the Democrats in the butt.”53
The “Race or Party?” question is an artificial way of dividing up a
world that has been dictated by American law and the Supreme Court.
Why artificial? Part of the reason that the Democratic Party appeals to
minority voters is that it supports policies that benefit minority voters. It
is hard to think of discrimination against Democrats as having a mere “incidental” effect on minority voters, given the significant overlap between
the two groups. On the flip side, part of the Republican opposition to
Democratic policies is that they are more redistributive, and that redistribution helps racial minorities who are disproportionately poor.
Republican operative Lee Atwater explained in 1981 how the Republican Party could appeal to racists without appearing racist itself by moving
from explicit racial appeals to talking about forced busing, cutting taxes,
and supporting other economic policies in which “blacks get hurt worse
than whites.” 54 Things have changed for the better, but perhaps not
enough. A Republican strategist recently told the New York Times that the
“Republican party needs to stop pandering to” racism.55 A recent report
on focus groups conducted with committed Republican voters by Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg found that “while few explicitly talk about
Obama in racial terms, the base supporters are very conscious of being
white in a country with growing minorities. Their party is losing to a
Democratic Party of big government whose goal is to expand programs
that mainly benefit minorities. Race remains very much alive in the politics of the Republican Party.”56
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53 Suppressing the Vote, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-october-23-2013/suppressing-the-vote.
54 Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy, THE
NATION (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous1981-interview-southern-strategy.
55 John Harwood, Behind the Roar of Political Debates, Whispers of Race Persist, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2013, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/us/politics/behind-roar-ofpolitics-whispers-of-race-persist.html (quoting Republican pollster Fred Steeper).
56 STAN GREENBERG ET AL., DEMOCRACY CORPS, INSIDE THE GOP: REPORT ON FOCUS
GROUPS WITH EVANGELICAL, TEA PARTY, AND MODERATE REPUBLICANS 2 (2013), available at
http://www.democracycorps.com/attachments/article/954/dcor%20rpp%20fg%20memo%20100313%20
final.pdf.
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IV. A NEW STANDARD BEYOND RACE OR PARTY
As the earlier sections demonstrated, race and party are intertwined,
especially in the South, but the legal standard is bifurcated. If a plaintiff
can raise a statutory Voting Rights Act or constitutional race-based claim
under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, the claim may well succeed. But claims of party discrimination go unchecked. In Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board,57 a voter identification case, for example,
Judge Posner held that the Democratic Party had standing to contest Indiana’s law because the law was going to make it harder to get Democratic
voters to the polls — but that the discrimination did not render the law unconstitutional.58 It did not matter to the Seventh Circuit majority, or later
to the Supreme Court, that this was a law was aimed at Democrats. As
Judge Evans declared in dissent, “Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage
election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”59
This bifurcation puts courts to an either/or choice: in the redistricting
cases, if “partisan” factors predominate in the legislature then those challenging the proposed district lines lose, but if “racial” factors predominate
they win. In the case of North Carolina’s new voter law, even if opponents can prove a bad “partisan” intent in passage of the law, they likely
will
still
lose
if
the
court
accepts
North
Carolina’s
posited-but-not-proven state interests, but if opponents can prove “racial”
intent, they likely will win.
Worse, the focus on race requires courts to make decisions about what
is in legislators’ hearts: is there a racist intent? That question puts off some
people who would otherwise be sympathetic to the argument that states
should not impose laws which make it harder to register and vote for no
good reason. A search for racist intent is not the most productive way to
think of these issues. Instead, we need to question the assumption that it is
permissible outside the redistricting context to discriminate on the basis of
party.
It is understandable why the Supreme Court has been reluctant to set
out a workable standard for policing partisan gerrymandering claims in
cases from Bandemer to Vieth to Easley: it is legitimate to have some con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
57
58

472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)
Id. at 951, 954. Judge Posner recently admitted he “absolutely” made a mistake in his vote upholding Indiana’s voter identification law in Crawford given that such laws now are “widely regarded
as means of voter suppression rather than fraud prevention.” John Schwartz, Judge in Landmark Case
Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2013, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-landmark-case-disavows-support-for-voterid.html. He has since moved away from that claim, saying only he is sure he “may” have been wrong.
Richard A. Posner, I Did Not ‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-not-recant-my-opinion-voter-id.
59 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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sideration of party in drawing district lines, if only to make sure that those
drawing district lines group together people with similar views and outlooks. But it is not so difficult to separate permissible from impermissible
consideration of party outside the redistricting context. When it comes to
the rules for running our elections (as opposed to rules for constructing our
legislative districts), there is a neutral standard against which we can judge
election laws: election rules should be crafted so that all eligible voters —
but only eligible voters — can easily register and cast a vote which will be
accurately counted.
In reviewing laws which impose burdens on voters, courts should adopt
something along the lines of the “strict scrutiny light” standard which
Judge Evans advanced in his Seventh Circuit Crawford dissent.60 When a
legislature passes an election-administration law discriminating against a
party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters, courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to require the legislature to
produce real and substantial evidence that it has a good reason for burdening voters and that its means are closely connected to achieving those
ends. This approach would not require delving into the motives of legislators to determine if they were merely self-interested and had passed laws
to hurt the other party,61 as opposed to being motivated by a desire to prevent fraud, save money, or instill voter confidence. Instead, evidence of
such intent should prompt courts to look skeptically upon asserted state interests unsupported by actual evidence.
When it comes to state voter identification laws, for example, the state
would have to show that impersonation voter fraud is a real problem, that
a photo identification requirement is a reasonably necessary means to solve
the problem, and that voters would not be overburdened by the requirement given the nature and extent of the state’s interest. A law limiting absentee balloting, for example, would be easier to sustain than a voter identification law, because of the more extensive evidence of vote buying
connected with the use of such ballots.62
An equal protection standard which requires substantial evidence justifying a burden on voters before a law would be considered constitutional
applies beyond voter identification. Think of North Carolina’s cutbacks in
early voting or the failure to count wrong precinct ballots. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled against Ohio on both of
these issues in the 2012 election season.63 The fact that the Republican
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
60
61

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
On problems with the search for “bad” legislative intent, see Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative
Intent, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 843.
62 See HASEN, supra note 14, at 41–73.
63 Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012) (early voting); Ne. Ohio Coal. for
the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2012) (wrong-precinct voting as a result of pollworker error).
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legislature passed the cutbacks over strenuous Democratic objections may
have raised the judges’ concerns.
One panel of the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio could not, absent a good
reason, cut back early voting for all voters except for military voters —
who could, but need not, be given extra early voting days by local election
boards.64 While the majority rule concerned discrimination between classes of voters, both the district court65 and concurring Judge White on the
Sixth Circuit66 focused on the fact that Ohio fixed its long-line problem in
2008 by extending early voting, and these judges feared that eliminating
early voting in 2012 would have made things worse for voters. Under
Judge White’s standard, the Equal Protection Clause would prevent a state
from making things worse for voters without good reason once it has made
them better.67
A different, and quite conservative, Sixth Circuit panel held that Ohio
could not disenfranchise voters who cast their votes in the wrong precinct
because of pollworker error.68 For example, the record showed that some
Ohio voters were disenfranchised because poll workers could not determine whether the numerical portion of a registrant’s address contained an
odd or even number.69 The court held the disenfranchisement caused by
poll worker error demonstrated likely success on the merits under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.70
The precise contours of judicial protection for voters remains to be
worked out. Applying a broader voter-protection standard as in Judge Evans’ Crawford dissent or the Sixth Circuit provisional ballot case, or even
a nonretrogression standard as in Judge White’s concurrence in the earlyvoting case, could solve some of the problems of the Voting Wars and discrimination against minority voters simultaneously: if a state deviates from
sound election administration practices, or imposes rules which increase
burdens on voters, the state could not defend doing so on grounds that the
law is meant to discriminate against Democratic voters. Nor could the
state defend it with conjecture about supposed but unproven harms. Instead, a state should have to justify the law with reasonable, nondiscriminatory reasons supported by substantial evidence. It is time to extend elec-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425. There are reasons to be skeptical of this equal protection holding. Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322765. Foley advocates for a
search for bad partisan intent, which differs from the approach I advocate for here.
65 Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F.Supp.2d 897, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
66 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 440–41 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67 Id. at 442.
68 Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless, 696 F.3d 580.
69 Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 819–20 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
70 Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless, 696 F.3d at 591.
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tion administration precedent in this voter-protective way that protects everyone from students to the elderly and all in-between.71
Some may reject my argument because it does not give race a sufficiently explicit role in policing elections. But it is unrealistic to expect the
current Supreme Court to endorse laws policing subtle racial discrimination in voting. The stronger claim before this Supreme Court is to protect
the voting process from partisan manipulation.
Despite Crawford, and its acceptance of the state’s purported but unproven interest in preventing voter impersonation fraud,72 there is some
reason to think that courts seeing the new Republican legislative overreach
on voting laws are becoming amenable to stricter scrutiny for laws burdening voters.73 Consider Judge Posner’s turnabout on voter identification
laws. Or consider what Justice Kennedy said in the Vieth partisan gerrymandering case: “If a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future
apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights to fair
and effective representation, though still in accord with one-person, onevote principles,’ we would surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.”74 Justice Kennedy’s principle is close to the reality of Texas’s and
North Carolina’s recent voting laws: they appear to have been enacted to
burden the Democratic Party’s rights to fair and effective representation.
Indeed, preferring one party for no good reason in election administration
is akin to awarding patronage jobs based upon partisan affiliation, a practice which the Court has held violates the First Amendment.75 There is
simply no logical relation between party affiliation and the government
choice.
Some may reject my argument because it puts a thumb on the scale favoring voters, contending that election “integrity” should be a paramount
value over preventing disenfranchisement. I do not reject integrity as a
value but argue it should be proven and not simply posited, especially
when many of the posited reasons appear pretextual. A rule making absentee balloting harder, for example, given ample evidence of absentee
ballot fraud could well be justified under my standard despite the burden
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 I remain concerned, as I was when Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, 696 F.3d 580,
issued, about courts adopting new rules such as these just before an election, when those rules could
affect the outcome of the election.
72 Crawford, 427 F.3d at 953; see also Richard L. Hasen, Why Judge Posner Changed His Mind on
BEAST
(Oct.
23,
2013,
2:35
PM),
Voter
ID
Laws,
DAILY
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/23/why-judge-posner-is-right-on-voter-id-laws.html
(“Justice Stevens’ opinion literally had to go back to the 1860s and Boss Tweed, plus a possible single
case of impersonation fraud in a 2004 Washington State election.”).
73 Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v.
Gore,
GEO.
WASH.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182857.
74 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
75 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (plurality opinion); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62, 66 (1990) (patronage-based firings unconstitutional).
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on voters who prefer the convenience of absentee voting. But a rule cutting back on early voting days (but keeping the same number of voting
hours) would not be sustained absent a good reason grounded in election
administration to do so.
My proposed rule would apply nationwide, not just to those states with
a history of discrimination in voting. But I suspect that, thanks to Shelby
County, there will be more attempts to game the system in formerly covered states, and that courts stepping in to require sound election administration will also be greatly helping the position of minority voters. Consider, for example, the City of Augusta, Georgia, which announced soon
after the Shelby County decision that it might move Election Day to the
summer,76 just as Democrats did in North Carolina in 1898. There is no
legitimate reason to move an election to a time when many voters are
away from home.
Finally, some may argue that the Court is unlikely to find a constitutional violation when a state favors one party in its election administration,
given that the Court has allowed states to favor incumbents in redistricting
and to protect the two-party system from competition.77 No case, however, has said that states can stack the rules about the casting and counting of
votes — the most basic election laws — to promote one major party over
that of another. The next step is for courts to recognize that states often
make voting rules for partisan reasons under the pretext of following sound
election administration practices.
Back in 1900, North Carolina resolved its election administration disputes with violence, intimidation, and ballot-box stuffing. We are mercifully no longer at that stage and I don’t expect we will never be there
again. North Carolina’s new law is not that. But we need to do more to
protect all voters when states take steps which make it harder, for no good
reason, for some voters to exercise the precious right to vote.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 Susan McCord, Court Ruling Revives Effort to Move Augusta Elections to July, AUGUSTA
CHRON. (Jun. 29, 2013), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/government/elections/2013-06-29/courtruling-revives-effort-move-augusta-elections-july.
77 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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